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Eric Brucker
In a recent note in this Review• , Justin D. Stolen con~lude? that
an increase of one letter grade in the average grade given m the
course can increase the instructor's evaluation and that "The fact
that the coefficient of grades is significant regardless of which questionnaire is used implies that the faculty has learned its importance." 1 His conclusions can be seriously questioned on two
grounds. First of all. any significant relationship, either n~gative or
positive. between grade level and the teacher eva~uat1on score
simply indicates that instructors. would be able to mfl_uenc~ the
evaluation. In no case can the existence of such a relat1onsh1p be
used to support the contention that instructors are necessarily
aware of the relationship or that it has been used or is likely to be
used to influence the student evaluation score. 2
Secondly, the actual relative magnitude of the coefficient. rather
than its significant sign. will determine how "successful" an instructor might be in ultimately influencing the outcome of student evaluations and how widespread the practice mig ht be.
For example, using the res ults reported in his firs t regression
and assuming the set of circumstances which might be least favorable for obtaining a strong evaluation I the predicted evaluation
would be 52. By "giving" all A's (X a 4 .00) the evaluation could be
raised to 60 . Thus a 100 per rent inflation in grades "given" would
produce a less than 16 per cent increase in the evaluation. And if
more "favorable" assumptions were made regarding the other variables. the relative percentage increase from a given percentage
grade inflation would be even smaller.
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lt is also interesting to note that if all faculty were to inflate
grades so that the reference group were given "group inflated B's"
~at_h~r. tha~ "C's_" the relative percentage gain from "giving" all
As , 1.e .. mflatmg from 3.00 to 4.00 or by 33 per cent, would be 7
per cent (55.82 to 59. 71). In other words. the g rade elasticity of
evaluation, :~ : , is always less t han 1 but in a period of general
g_rade infla~ion ~ould_be higher (i.e. , .16 vs .21) and thus competitive grade mflat1on might become more "profitable.''
. *Ju.~tin D. Stole n. "Uncertainty. Grades and Student Evaluations, Southern Business Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, p . 43, Fall, 1975.
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It should als~ be n?ted that, if the eval uator ignores the impact of
ge~er~l _grade mflat10~ on all ~tudent evaluations, by looking only
at md1v1dual faculty time series data a 33 per cent individual at.
ten:pt to influe~ce grades more tha_n they h~ve been by general inflat10n would yield a 16 per cent increase m ratings, or a grade
elasticity of evaluation of .48.
Therefore, it would appear that the magnitude of the grades
"given," which were not earned, must be very large to greatly influence the evaluation. Faculty who "buy" evaluations by fostering
such large discrepancies between actual performance and grades
awarded must weigh the gain against the possible negative impact
upon less quantitative forms of instructor evaluation, such as informal chairperson review. Given the relatively small grade elasticities of evaluation, the total net benefits might well be negative and
therefore discourage the conscious use of individual grade inflation.
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In summary, Stolen has not presented evidence that faculty do
actually attempt to influence evaluation through giving grades. His
findings further lead one to conclude that the benefits of behaving
in such a manner are small and may well fall short of the potential
professional and collegial costs which might occur. Furthermore,
while the benefits become somewhat larger, in a period of general
grade inflation, department chairs can tend to discourage individual grade inflation by using comparative cross-sectional scores,
rather than absolute scores for measuring teaching effectiveness.
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FOOTNOTES
Justin D. Stolen, "Uncertainty. Grades and Student Evalua·
tions," Southern Business Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, p. 43, Fall, 1975.
1

1
Although to the extent that instructors are familiar with
Stolen's results, the awareness condition may be met.

3 A female, (X 2 =0) with 30 years of experienc~ !X 1 = 30).
teaching a freshman course (X ~, X :; , X 6
0) in dec1s10n SCiences
(X 1 , X 9 = 0, Xx= 1) in a 100 student section (X 10 = 1_00) not on
the Monday, Wednesday, Friday sequence (X 11
q) with all stu·
dents actually earning C's if evaluated by an unbiased common
grading criteria (X 3
2.00).
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